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 This  paper  analyses  decisions  on  energy  efficiency  (EE)  investments  by  small  and  medium 
manufacturing enterprises in the U.S. which have received assessment from the Department of Energy 
(DoE).  The  results  confirm  the  importance  of  payback  time  and  investment  costs  as  the  main 
determining factors in deciding whether to invest in energy efficiency. This behaviour is kept through 
time. Such investment recommendations are frequently not implemented even though they apparently 
entail major advantages and give rise to considerable energy savings. The data show results which are 
compatible with a series of elementary valuation processes (limited by the availability of information), 
far removed from other, more academically ambitious methods such as Net Present Value (NPV) and the 
Real Options (RO) method. The paper analyses the impact of the physical situation of firms in line with 
their geographical locations in different US states, and changes over time from 1984 to 2008, i.e. 25 
years of information. Finally, the paper examines the different levels of effectiveness of participating 
centres  in  getting  firms  to  decide  to  make  the  investments  proposed.  EE  investment  decisions  are 
analysed here using Logit models whose parameters are calibrated on the basis of the information held 
in the Industrial Assessment Centres (IAC) database. The results shed some light on impact assessment 
and suggest various policies for promoting investment in EE.  
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1  Introduction 
Energy transformation and consumption account for a large proportion of anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This means that energy efficiency policies form an essential part of 
climate  policy  and  are  a  smart  way  of  reducing  the  depletion  of  already  scarce,  limited  natural 
resources. Indeed, energy efficiency (EE) has been one of the mainstays of energy policy in recent 
years, be it for reasons of competitiveness in the economy, availability of resources or other reasons 
of a more strategic, geopolitical nature. 
For example, in regard to climate policy, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates 
that EE policies could bring about reductions of as much as 10-15% in annual CO2 emissions world-
wide at no additional cost (IEA, 2009)). Energy efficiency may also enable highly significant cost 
reductions  to  be  made  in  most  public  and  private  activities,  but  the  truth  is  that  many  private 
investments which are more than justified in economic terms are simply not made. This is known as 
the “energy efficiency paradox” (Jaffe et al 2004, Linares and Labandeira 2010), and can be explained 
by  barriers  such  as  insufficient  information,  the  “principal-agent”  problem,  difficulties  in  gaining 
access to capital and even divergence between private and social discount rates.  
In the USA, as in many other countries, efforts in this area have formed a core part of energy 
policy. In this context one of the longest-running policies is the so-called programme of “Industrial 
Assessment Centres (IAC)”  of the  U.S. Department  of Energy's Office  of Energy Efficiency and 
renewable Energy
2. This programme has  been in place since 1976, with the main aim of getting 
industry to increase productivity and reduce its environmental impact through energy efficiency, 
waste minimisation and the prevention of atmospheric pollution. 
The  programme  works  basically  through  i n-plant  assessment,  i.e.  energy  audits  or 
evaluations are performed on site at  Small and Medium Enterprises ( SME)  in the manufacturing 
sector. To have access to the programme, applicants must meet the following requirements
3:  
- Gross sales of at least US$ 100 million per annum. 
- Energy costs of between $100,000 and $2.5 million per year. 
- No more than 500 employees. 
- No in-house technical specialists capable of performing investment analysis. 
-  A location no more than 150 miles from the campus of the pa rticipating centre that 
performs the assessment. 
In-plant assessments are undertaken by staff and students from 26 centres at 31 renowned 
participating universities in the US. There has been some variation in the participating centres over 
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3 Requirements defined for those SMEs with standard industrial classification (SIC) codes 20 to 39. 3 
 
the years, as can be seen in the IAC database. To date
4, more than 14,000 assessments have been 
performed and 108,000 recommendations made. 
The IAC database, on which this paper is based, has sparked the interest of a limited number 
of researchers, as described briefly in the following section. Among the resulting papers, Anderson 
and Newell (2004) stands out: their main result is that, consistent with the aforesaid energy efficiency 
paradox,  the firms analysed seem to be more sensitive to investment costs than to the savings that can 
be made as a result of energy efficiency measures. 
2  Earlier Studies 
The main studies that have made use of the information in the IAC database to date are 
Tonn and Martín (2000); Anderson and Newell (2004); Dobbs (2009); and Muthulingam et al (2009). 
Tonn  and  Martín  (2000)  analyse  the  changes  over  time  in  corporate  decision-making  on  energy 
efficiency  using  a  seven-stage  model  that  covers  eventualities  from  zero  consideration  of  energy 
efficiency in decision-making to excellence in EE management in situations where it has become a 
fundamental  part  of  the  corporate  culture.  Their  results  show  that  the  number  of  potential 
improvements  in  EE  drops  over  time,  due  mainly  to  the  fact  that  the  best  opportunities  for 
improvement are taken up first, with more complex, less effective measures being left for subsequent 
years.  This  effect  is  present  even  when  new  improvements  arise  as  a  result  of  developments  in 
technology. 
According to these authors the main purpose of the IAC programme is three-fold: (1) to 
speed  up  the  transition  to  higher  stages  of  the  life-cycle  model  through  assessment;  (2)  to  train 
students and personnel with a view to their being hired by the firms in question; and (3) to distribute 
information through the programme’s website. The method used in the paper involves questionnaires 
sent to firms that have undergone IAC assessments, to students who have taken part in the programme 
and to users of the IAC  website
5. The main conclusion is that firms which have undergone IAC 
assessment advance, on average, one stage further in the life-cycle model in a few years. 
The paper by Anderson and Newell (2004) cited above analyses decisions by manufacturing 
firms that use the IAC programme. They develop a number of Logit models that the authors calibrate 
with data from 1981-2000
6. Their results show positive impacts for the following variables: shorter 
payback periods, lower investment cost, greater annual energy savings, increased energy costs and 
greater energy conservation. 
Muthulingam et al (2009) uses the IAC database to compare four hypotheses: (a) the short-
sightedness of firms that fail to adopt certain EE measures in spite of their high rate of return; (b) the 
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5  The questionnaires were answered by 42 companies, 132 former students who had taken part in the 
assessments and 29 users of the IAC website. 
6 The payback model, the cost-benefit model and the price-quantity model. 4 
 
idea that firms give more importance to the cost of investment than to the potential savings; (c) the 
possible influence of the order in which assessment recommendations are made on their acceptance 
(with the first recommendations being the  most likely to be accepted); and (d) the impact of the 
number  of  recommendations.  Their  results  support  the  hypothesis  that  (a),  (b)  and  (c)  are  all 
significant.  In  regard  to  (d),  the  acceptance  ratio  does  not  decrease  when  the  number  of 
recommendations per firm increases. 
The papers by Anderson and Newell (2004) and Muthulingam et al (2009) highlight the 
importance of payback time as a particularly significant indicator for assessing whether investment in 
EE is implemented. Note that other, more technically appropriate indicators such as the Net Present 
Value (NPV) cannot be calculated with the information available: although the database contains a 
great deal of information it has nothing on the useful lifetime of investments or, therefore, on the total 
savings that may be obtained from them. If accurate information is not used, this point could be 
detrimental to the acceptance of investments with longer payback periods. 
The short-term view, i.e. the implementation of investments that present shorter payback 
times, has a negative influence on decisions by firms, as it is conducive to low investment rates and a 
lack of innovation, features that both seem unsustainable over time. However, the evidence confirms 
that this behaviour does persist over time. The reason for this apparent paradox must be sought in 
financial variables such as uncertainty and liquidity constraints, under which it is optimal to stick to 
the  shortest  payback  periods  or  the  highest  hurdle  rates
7.  For  example  increased  uncertainty 
concerning income could justify some aspects of this behaviour in regard to costs. 
The impact of short-termism is studied by Dobbs (2009) via a survey. His paper concludes 
that firms apply a high discount rate, sometimes more than 20%, with required maximum payback 
times of just 2 or 3 years being relatively frequent. This simple rule of thumb is widespread among  
firms, and its application results in their ignoring specific features of investment projects, such as 
differences in risk. 
Corporate decision-making models are studied by  Graham and Harvey (2001), who report 
the results of a survey that elicited responses from 392 chief financial officers. This report shows that 
a large number of firms use company -wide discount rates to evaluate projects rather than project -
specific discount rates. 
The present paper looks in greater depth at these issues by estimating var ious decision-
making models that depend on different explanatory variables, but differs from earlier studies in that 
it does not assess the suitability of the actions taken by firms. The main objective is to help identify 
measures to support investment in  EE that may be useful in decision -making and in public policy 
design, given that firms behave as reported in the IAC Database. The study refers solely to electricity-
related EE investments.  
                                                   
7  The  hurdle  discount  rate  is  the  rate  chosen  by  the  company  as  the  minimum  yield  required  from  new 
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3  The Data 
This paper uses the information contained in the IAC database at 04/15/2010, i.e. 14,520 
assessments with a total of 108,562 recommendations, which average out to 7.5 recommendations per 
assessment. 
The information available has been adjusted for the purposes of this study as follows: 
- Records dating from before 1984 and after 2008 are disregarded, so as to give a data period 
of 25 years with full information. The records for 2009 and 2010 were ruled out because the final 
outcomes of many of the recommendations are not yet known. 
- The sample is restricted to decisions reported as “implemented” and “not implemented”. 
This means excluding those recommendations whose status is not reported or is pending, and those 
recorded as “data excluded” or “unavailable”. 
- As a result of doubts concerning the quality of some data, recommendations with payback 
periods of more than 9 years and less than 0 are also excluded. 
- A minor series of records concerned with Puerto Rico are excluded. 
- Only those recommendations concerned with electricity are considered. This means that 
records containing information on secondary, tertiary and quaternary savings in a number of fuels are 
excluded.  This  is  to  prevent  decisions  from  being  tainted  by  prices  other  than  electricity  prices. 
However, secondary, tertiary and quaternary savings in resource costs and production are included. 
After  these  detailed  adjustments,  the  sample  for  analysis  comprises  60,463  EE 
recommendations, listed according to different US states. 
Preliminary  analysis  revealed  that  the  IAC  database  lacked  important  information  on  a 
significant  matter:  the  lifetime  of  each  recommendation  for  improvement.  Authors  such  as 
Muthulingam et al (2009) assume a lifetime of 3 years for projects of all types, while Anderson and 
Newell (2004) estimate that decisions by firms are compatible with the use of a hurdle rate of 50%-
100% for investments with useful lifetimes of 10 years or more. 
4  Preliminary Analysis   
The first point that emerges from an analysis of the 60,463 recommendations selected for 
this study is that the mean percentage of implementation is only 53.17%. In other words, almost half 
the  recommendations  made  do  not  ultimately  result  in  a  decision  to  invest.  Bearing  in  mind  the 
extremely  high  potential  for  improvement  associated  with  investment  in  energy  efficiency,  as 
mentioned above, this percentage can be considered as relatively low. There may be various reasons 
for this finding. The present paper seeks to shed light on this issue, but before more technical points 
are considered it may be useful here to give some descriptive data to help readers appreciate the 





An analysis of the variations in the percentage of measures implemented over the whole 
time series (see Figure 1) reveals that it is higher between 1984 and 1989 and lowest between 2000 
and 2008. At first sight the drop since 1995 and the trend over that time suggest a clear depletion 
effect in the best opportunities for investment, i.e. the easiest, most cost-effective measures are taken 
first and more complex actions are left for later. Unless there is a major depletion in improvement 
opportunities  the  results  are  not  compatible  with  a  shift  to  more  sophisticated  decision-making 
models. But if the degree of implementation industry by industry is considered (Figure 2) variations 
of between 47 and almost 57% can be seen in the implementation rate. 
Implementation rates differ from one type of manufacturing industry (as per SIC code) to 
another, with the highest being found in Tobacco and Petroleum and Coal, and the lowest in Printing 
and Publishing. Even so, almost all manufacturing industries show acceptance rates of over 50%. 
There  is  great  disparity  from  one  industry  to  another  in  terms  of  the  total  number  of 
recommendations made (see Figure 3), ranging from 29 for Tobacco to over 7,000 for Fabricated 
Metal Products, Rubber and Miscellaneous, and Food and Kindred. Given the different behaviour 













Figure 4 is consistent with the studies by Anderson and Newell (2004) and Muthulingam et 
al  (2009)  in  showing  payback  time  to  be  a  determining  factor  in  investment  decisions  for 
manufacturing SMEs in the USA. This assertion is checked below using econometric methods. It is 
not unreasonable to assume that this could result from a number of behavioural aspects such as short-
termism,  budget  constraints  and  incorrect  investment  assessment  practices,  among  others.  For 
instance, Graham et al (2005) show that 78% of 400 CFO´s in US public and private firms scarify 
long-term value in order to keep short term predictability in earnings. But it is important to point out 
that other financial aspects could be equally significant, such as the risk entailed by investments (e.g. 
technological risk), liquidity constraints and uncertainty affecting both income and costs. There seems 
to be no clear evidence that this behaviour has changed much over time, so the response of firms to 
these EE programmes is taken as given. 
 
Figure 4  
 
 
If the proportion of measures implemented is broken down by energy management ARCs
8, 
the rate of acceptance of measures aimed at the Motor System stands out, in contrast to the very low 
rate for Total Energy Management measures (see Figure 5). 
 
                                                   
8 ARC's are Assessment Recommendation Codes, in which recommendations are grouped by type (e.g. those 





Investment  cost  is,  of  course,  one  of  the  measures  that  initially  seem  most  relevant  in 
decision-making concerning investment (Figure 6). As may be expected, the acceptance rate falls 
markedly as costs increase. 
 
Figure 6  
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Another feature revealed by an analysis of the data is highlighted in Figure 7: for most firms 
the amount of sales (as an indicator of size) does not seem to have any clearly significant influence on 





IAC  data also reveal the  distribution  of the implementation rate  of recommendations  in 
terms of location by state. This information is shown in Table 1 below. The highest ranking state is 
Alaska with a 70% implementation rate, followed by West Virginia with 65%, and the lowest is Utah 
with just 31%. These data should be analysed together with other information such as the total number 
of recommendations and the number of companies per industry, but even so it raises many interesting 
questions. Is this difference explained by particular environmental and energy legislation in some 
States that it is not present in others? Or can it be put down to something related to the reputation of 
the centres making the recommendations? Answering to these questions is far beyond the scope of 
this paper but all of them are plausible explanations that should not be disdained. Table 2 offers some 






Table 1  
State  Implemented  Not Implemented  Total  % Implemented 
Alaska  26  11  37  70.27% 
Alabama  290  274  564  51.42% 
Arkansas  872  486  1358  64.21% 
Arizona  1033  1372  2405  42.95% 
California  2634  2439  5073  51.92% 
Colorado  1394  866  2260  61.68% 
Connecticut  268  256  524  51.15% 
Delaware  83  108  191  43.46% 
Florida  1360  1578  2938  46.29% 
Georgia  1222  1049  2271  53.81% 
Hawaii  33  19  52  63.46% 
Iowa  937  758  1695  55.28% 
Idaho  47  61  108  43.52% 
Illinois  1489  1972  3461  43.02% 
Indiana  676  845  1521  44.44% 
Kansas  733  588  1321  55.49% 
Kentucky  276  329  605  45.62% 
Louisiana  649  561  1210  53.64% 
Massachusetts  622  509  1131  55.00% 
Maryland  140  135  275  50.91% 
Maine  367  319  686  53.50% 
Michigan  684  714  1398  48.93% 
Minnesota  462  333  795  58.11% 
Missouri  1475  965  2440  60.45% 
Mississippi  507  716  1223  41.46% 
Montana  18  14  32  56.25% 
North Carolina  1206  913  2119  56.91% 
North Dakota  17  28  45  37.78% 
Nebraska  290  212  502  57.77% 
New Hampshire  195  159  354  55.08% 
New Jersey  575  554  1129  50.93% 
New Mexico  60  71  131  45.80% 
Nevada  249  263  512  48.63% 
New York  842  693  1535  54.85% 
Ohio  1628  1200  2828  57.57% 
Oklahoma  1220  928  2148  56.80% 
Oregon  904  668  1572  57.51% 
Pennsylvania  975  795  1770  55.08% 
Rhode Island  68  62  130  52.31% 
South Carolina  195  182  377  51.72% 
South Dakota  76  62  138  55.07% 
Tennessee  839  705  1544  54.34% 
Texas  2493  1599  4092  60.92% 
Utah  128  281  409  31.30% 
Virginia  543  472  1015  53.50% 
Vermont  59  38  97  60.82% 
Washington  317  259  576  55.03% 
Wisconsin  527  651  1178  44.74% 
West Virginia  400  212  612  65.36% 
Wyoming  48  28  76  63.16% 








Table 2  
Active IAC Centres 
Primary Centre  Implemented  Not Implemented  Total  % Implemented 
Texas A&M – College Station   1780  1042  2822  63.08% 
Bradley University  856  1007  1863  45.95% 
Colorado State University  1585  1038  2623  60.43% 
Georgia Tech Research Institute  1461  1185  2646  55.22% 
Iowa State University  1307  1028  2335  55.97% 
University of Illinois - Chicago  365  391  756  48.28% 
Lehigh University  396  516  912  43.42% 
Louisiana University - Lafayette  546  583  1129  48.36% 
University of Massachusetts  1204  1045  2249  53.53% 
University of Miami  279  399  678  41.15% 
Mississippi State University  571  802  1373  41.59% 
University of Missouri - Columbia  52  40  92  56.52% 
North Carolina State University  832  747  1579  52.69% 
Oklahoma State University  1461  1126  2587  56.47% 
Oregon State University  1279  938  2217  57.69% 
San Diego State University  1204  1011  2215  54.36% 
San Francisco State University  1031  1114  2145  48.07% 
Syracuse University  558  392  950  58.74% 
University of Tennessee  1106  863  1969  56.17% 
Tennessee Tech  52  106  158  32.91% 
University of Alabama  68  95  163  41.72% 
University of Dayton  1170  1044  2214  52.85% 
University of Florida  1138  1238  2376  47.90% 
University of Michigan – Ann Arbor  540  580  1120  48.21% 
University of Washington  30  58  88  34.09% 
West Virginia University  1599  819  2418  66.13% 
Total Active Centres  22470  19207  41677  53.91% 
Former and Other Centres  9681  9105  18786  51.53% 
Total Centres  32151  28312  60463  53.17% 
 
5  Modelling and Estimation   
For the analysis presented here equation (1) has been drawn up to represent the choice of 
implementing or not implementing an EE improvement recommendation. If the recommendation is 
implemented it will result in a number of net benefits expressed by the latent variable y*. It is the yes/ 
no decision of firms that is observable: 
                                        (1)
 
Where the sub-indices refer to: 
(i) The characteristics of the EE investment project; 
(j) The characteristics of the firm; 13 
 
(k) The state in which firms are located and those variables that may differ from one US state to 
another (e.g. environmental legislation, idiosyncratic features of employers, etc.); 
(l) The influence of the SIC group to which firms belong; 
(m) The impact of the type of investment as per its ARC; 
(n) The influence of the IAC Centre that performs the assessment. 
 
In this context the following can be observed: 
                                                     (2) 
and 
                                                     (3) 
 
Therefore, we have the following for a Probit model: 
,                     (4) 
Where  φ  is  the  normal  cumulative  distribution  function  and  ψ  has  a  normal  distribution  and  is 




The main details of the variables used in the estimation are shown in table 3: 
Table 3:  
 Variable    Acronym    Obs.    Mean    Std. Dev. 
 payback time   PB    60,463    1.1082    1.3450 
ln(payback time)    ln(PB)    51,220    -0.4119    1.4034 
ln(payback time)2    ln(PB) 2    51,220    2.1393    4.1873 
State GDP   GDP    60,464    45,145.28    39684.13 
ln(State GDP)    ln(GDP)    60,463    10.3101    0.9725 
ln(State GDP) 2    ln(GDP) 2    60,463    107,2435    19.6947 
Emissions    EMI    49,918    197,2448    159.7737 
ln(Emissions)    ln(EMI)    49,918    4,9738    0.8237 
Year  YEAR  60,463  1997.433  6.32228 
Ln(EE Cost)  Ln(Cost)  50,953  7.202315  1.919909 
Ln(Yearly EE Benefits)  Ln(BEN)  60,449  7.570395  1.504785 
 
Conventionally, models of this type result in around 11 variables, including both the log and 
the square (the latter to incorporate trend effects into the analysis). The mean payback time stands out 
among the data shown in table 3. At 1.1082 this might be seen as a significantly small figure. 
We used 7 different specifications in our estimations. They include a number of variations 
of the specifications of a model based on payback time (specifications 1, 2, 3) and a cost/benefit based 
model (specifications 4, 5, 6 & 7). These are the two families of model which are conventionally used 
in studies of this kind (e.g. Anderson and Newell (2004)). 14 
 
EE improvement policy to reduce the use of electricity is linked to reductions in emissions 
of CO2, SO2 and NOx pollutants. Taking the electricity generation mix into account, for each 1 MWh 
saved in the US, averaged over the period 1997-2008, 629 kg of CO2, 2.83 kg of SO2 and 1.26 kg of 
NOx have been saved. These data are shown in the following table 4, which also reveals the fall over 
time in pollution per MWh generated in the US. 
 
Table 4  






















1997  3,492,172.00  2,253,783.00  13,480.00  6,500.00  645  3.86  1.86 
1998  3,620,295.00  2,345,951.00  13,464.00  6,459.00  648  3.72  1.78 
1999  3,694,810.00  2,360,424.00  12,843.00  5,955.00  639  3.48  1.61 
2000  3,802,105.00  2,464,550.00  11,963.00  5,638.00  648  3.15  1.48 
2001  3,736,644.00  2,412,030.00  11,174.00  5,290.00  646  2.99  1.42 
2002  3,858,452.00  2,417,327.00  10,881.00  5,194.00  627  2.82  1.35 
2003  3,883,185.00  2,438,338.00  10,646.00  4,532.00  628  2.74  1.17 
2004  3,970,555.00  2,479,971.00  10,309.00  4,143.00  625  2.60  1.04 
2005  4,055,423.00  2,536,675.00  10,340.00  3,961.00  626  2.55  0.98 
2006  4,064,702.00  2,481,829.00  9,524.00  3,799.00  611  2.34  0.93 
2007  4,156,745.00  2,539,805.00  9,042.00  3,650.00  611  2.18  0.88 
2008  4,119,388.00  2,477,213.00  7,830.00  3,330.00  601  1.90  0.81 
Total  46,454,476.00  29,207,896.00  131,496.00  58,451.00  629  2.83  1.26 
Source: Based on EIA (US Energy Information Administration) data. 
 
 
Specification 1: payback time only 
 
The first model used in this study is the most basic, in that it includes only PB, since the 
preliminary analysis as per Section 2 suggests that this is a determinant variable in EE investment 
decisions. The model used is as follows: 
 
                                   (5) 
 
Where payback time  is defined as the cost of  EE investment  divided by the per annum 
savings that result. The results for this specification of a Probit model are shown in Table 5. As can be 
observed, both variables are highly significant and, as expected, negative in sign.  In other words, the 
shorter the payback time on the investment measures suggested, the greater the tendency to invest in 





Probit regression                                                                                                       Number of obs   =      51220 
                                                                                                                                  Wald chi2(2)      =     928.72 
                                                                                                                                   Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -34972.098                                                                         Pseudo R2         =     0.0132 
Impstat  Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
ln(PB)  -0.16052  0.005765  -27.85  0  -0.17182  -0.14922 
ln(PB)
2  -0.02236  0.001959  -11.42  0  -0.0262  -0.01852 
constant  0.043845  0.006291  6.97  0  0.031514  0.056175 
 
 
To study the sensitivity of this variable, the following equation must be defined: 
                                 (6) 
Where   is the standard normal density, obtained from: 
                                                                (7) 
 
The sensitivity of the probability of acceptance of investment in the face of variations in 
payback time is therefore given by: 
                                        (8) 
 
Note that this sensitivity depends on the PB variable. This is tantamount to stating that a 
given  percentage  decrease  in  PB  will  increase  the  likelihood  of  acceptance  by  different  amounts 
depending on the initial PB.  
This result suggests that policies intended to reduce payback times are bound to be effective 
in increasing the rate of investment in EE measures. Reductions in PB may be obtained, for instance, 
by subsidising investment.  These points are taken into account in the policy analysis presented in the 
final section below. 
The probability of an investment being made can be obtained from the following formula: 
 
                 (9) 
 
Like sensitivity, probability of implementation is thus shown in equation (9) to depend on 
PB. These two points are shown graphically in Figure 8. From this figure it can be observed that the 
probability  of  an  investment  being  made  decreases  as  the  payback  time  in  years  increase,  while 
sensitivity  increases  significantly.  From  a  public  policy  viewpoint  this  suggests  that  a  policy  of 
subsidies  would  be  most  effective  for  those  EE  investments  which  have  the  shortest  PBs,  and 16 
 
especially for those with PBs of less than one year. As the number of years’ payback time increase, 
the effectiveness of a lump-sum subsidy decreases gradually and significantly. This entirely intuitive 
result seems to be confirmed through this simple econometric estimation. The specifications below 
seek to enrich this analysis. 
 




Specification 2: payback time plus variables for the state where plants are located 
 
In this second case two further variables are considered: the GDP of the state where each 
manufacturing plant is located (as an indicator of the wealth of surrounding area) and the total CO2 
emissions from that state (as an indicator of pollution levels in the area).  The following model is 
obtained: 
          (10) 
 
The results shown in table 6 suggest that firms located in the states with the highest emission 
levels are more likely to invest in EE. By contrast, firms in the states with the highest GDPs from 
manufacturing industry are, paradoxically, less likely to invest in EE, all else being equal. In other 
words, it is in states where GDP is lowest that firms show the greatest tendency to invest in EE. 
A policy recommendation that can be drawn directly from these results is that supporting 
measures  should  be  most  effective  in  those  states  where  industrial  GDP  is  lowest  and  the  CO2 
emission rate is highest. The former is reasonable as the marginal benefit of abating emissions is 17 
 
likely to be greater in those states where emissions are higher, while one could not easily explain the 
fact that companies in less richer states might be willing to invest more. If the possibility is considered 
of  a  future  market  for  CO2  emission  rights  or  a  similar  mechanism  for  carbon  price  fixing  that 
penalises emissions, reduction measures would also result in other benefits which would be by no 
means negligible.  
 
Table 6 
Probit regression                                                                                                    Number of obs   =     42715 
                                                                                                                               Wald chi2(4)      =     759.68 
                                                                                                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -29207.709                                                                       Pseudo R2        =     0.0130 
Impstat  Coef.  Robust Std. 
Err.  Z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
ln(PB)  -0.15358  0.006227  -24.66  0  -0.16579  -0.14138 
ln(PB)
2  -0.02001  0.002068  -9.67  0  -0.02406  -0.01595 
ln(GDP)  -0.03536  0.012881  -2.74  0.006  -0.0606  -0.01011 
ln(EMI)  0.032187  0.015455  2.08  0.037  0.001896  0.062478 
Constant  0.22411  0.07683  2.92  0.004  0.073525  0.374694 
 
In  this  model  the  coefficients    and    are  changed,  which  implies  changes  in  the 
sensitivity and in the probability of acceptance of a given PB in accordance with the characteristics of 
each state. 
 




Figure 10:  Sensitivity to Emissions 
  
 
The graphs above show the probability and sensitivity levels when GDP and emissions are a 
percentage of their mean values for the total sample. When that percentage is 100, the values obtained 
for  probability  are  quite  close  to  those  for  the  case  in  Specification  1,  when  the  payback  time 
considered is the mean value, which in this case was 1,1082. 
 
 
Specification  3:  payback  time  plus  state  variables,  dummies  for  assessment  centres,  sectors  of 
industry and ARC 
 
 
                                        (11) 
 
The results obtained are shown in the table 7. When the value obtained from the dummy for 
a  state  is  positive  and  higher  than  that  of  another  state,  there  is  a  greater  likelihood  of 
recommendations being implemented in that state if the conditions of the remaining variables are 
equal. Of course, there may be other effects in each state reflected in other variables which may alter 





Table 7   
Probit regression                                                                                               Number of obs  =       42715 
                                                                                                                          Wald chi2(56)   =    2554.40 
                                                                                                                           Prob > chi2       =      0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -28233.037                                                                 Pseudo R2         =       0.0459 
Impstat  Coef.  Robust Std. Err.  Z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
ln(PB)  -0.13891  0.0065483  -21.21  0  -0.15174  -0.12607 
ln(PB)
2  -0.01663  0.0021296  -7.81  0  -0.0208  -0.01245 
ln(GDP)  -0.09546  0.0210359  -4.54  0  -0.13669  -0.05423 
Fy  -0.01405  0.0014248  -9.86  0  -0.01684  -0.01125 
ln(EMI)  0.140324  0.0275568  5.09  0  0.086314  0.194334 
California  0.24779  0.0337482  7.34  0  0.181645  0.313935 
Maine  -0.66727  0.1527586  -4.37  0  -0.96667  -0.36787 
Missouri  0.150748  0.0587845  2.56  0.01  0.035532  0.265963 
newmexico  -0.36085  0.1225509  -2.94  0.003  -0.60104  -0.12065 
northcarol~a  0.316029  0.0398446  7.93  0  0.237935  0.394123 
northdakota  -0.48895  0.1930997  -2.53  0.011  -0.86742  -0.11048 
Ohio  0.175088  0.0518163  3.38  0.001  0.07353  0.276646 
southcarol~a  0.161814  0.0810233  2  0.046  0.003011  0.320616 
Tennessee  0.084223  0.0499136  1.69  0.092  -0.01361  0.182052 
Texas  0.139528  0.0526012  2.65  0.008  0.036431  0.242624 
Utah  -0.3172  0.0724917  -4.38  0  -0.45928  -0.17512 
Wyoming  -0.44532  0.2037495  -2.19  0.029  -0.84466  -0.04598 
Cam  0.307153  0.0549704  5.59  0  0.199413  0.414893 
Cbd  0.081042  0.0354968  2.28  0.022  0.011469  0.150614 
Cco  0.374136  0.0356674  10.49  0  0.304229  0.444043 
Cgt  0.236764  0.0350902  6.75  0  0.167988  0.305539 
Cia  0.261999  0.0322069  8.13  0  0.198875  0.325123 
Cic  0.211747  0.0576858  3.67  0  0.098684  0.324809 
Cma  0.418462  0.0427273  9.79  0  0.334718  0.502207 
Cmi  -0.27234  0.0578192  -4.71  0  -0.38566  -0.15901 
Cok  0.174008  0.0362826  4.8  0  0.102896  0.245121 
Cor  0.48572  0.0414996  11.7  0  0.404382  0.567057 
Csf  -0.14384  0.0390443  -3.68  0  -0.22036  -0.06731 
Csu  0.445118  0.0564879  7.88  0  0.334404  0.555832 
Ctt  -0.31662  0.1667725  -1.9  0.058  -0.64349  0.010246 
Cud  0.150196  0.0581603  2.58  0.01  0.036203  0.264188 
Cum  0.133807  0.0432853  3.09  0.002  0.048969  0.218644 
Cwv  0.420125  0.0382611  10.98  0  0.345135  0.495116 
Car  0.632758  0.0491688  12.87  0  0.536389  0.729127 
Cds  0.375129  0.0607715  6.17  0  0.256019  0.494239 
Cku  0.194164  0.0455336  4.26  0  0.10492  0.283408 
Cme  0.993715  0.1544203  6.44  0  0.691057  1.296373 
Cmo  0.189721  0.0672137  2.82  0.005  0.057984  0.321457 
Cul  -0.41333  0.0809364  -5.11  0  -0.57197  -0.2547 
sic20  0.066217  0.0205471  3.22  0.001  0.025945  0.106488 
sic21  0.494637  0.2625326  1.88  0.06  -0.01992  1.009191 
sic25  0.101501  0.0393484  2.58  0.01  0.02438  0.178623 
sic29  0.191492  0.0672219  2.85  0.004  0.05974  0.323245 
sic32  0.072094  0.0347473  2.07  0.038  0.003991  0.140197 
sic33  0.048945  0.0262843  1.86  0.063  -0.00257  0.100461 
sic34  0.045435  0.0197197  2.3  0.021  0.006785  0.084085 
sic35  0.085272  0.0217843  3.91  0  0.042576  0.127969 
sic37  0.153844  0.0282918  5.44  0  0.098393  0.209295 
arc21  -0.48171  0.0927528  -5.19  0  -0.6635  -0.29992 
arc22  -0.25304  0.0403388  -6.27  0  -0.33211  -0.17398 
arc23  -0.19913  0.0411753  -4.84  0  -0.27983  -0.11842 
arc24  0.280637  0.0304578  9.21  0  0.220941  0.340334 
arc25  -0.39904  0.1304271  -3.06  0.002  -0.65467  -0.14341 
arc27  0.098462  0.030886  3.19  0.001  0.037927  0.158998 
arc28  -0.3014  0.080856  -3.73  0  -0.45988  -0.14293 
arc29  -1.08338  0.3054871  -3.55  0  -1.68213  -0.48464 




Specification 4: with cost and benefit 
 




The results in table 8 show that the cost factor has a greater impact on investment decisions 
than the potential medium and long-term benefits.  This result is consistent with the findings of other 
studies, under the so-called “energy efficiency paradox”. Similar behaviour has even been observed 
among  individual  consumers  when  they  choose  the  energy  efficiency  level  of  their  domestic 
appliances (Markandya et al, 2009). From a public policy viewpoint it seems advisable, therefore, to 
focus  on  this  issue  through  policies  to  support  reductions  in  investment  costs  (subsidies  for 
investments, tax deductions, cheaper loans,  etc) as opposed to longer term policies that focus on 
increasing the benefits from investment (increases in energy prices or carbon pricing, for example). 
The  effects  of  different  combinations  of  investment  cost  with  annual  savings  can  be 
observed. Logically, the probabilities are highest in cases where there are both considerable savings 
and  low  EE  investment  costs.  However,  even  with  these  highly  favourable  combinations  the 
probability of acceptance does not exceed 70%. 
This model can also be represented by a three-dimensional graph (Figure 12). 
 
Table 8:  
Probit regression                                                                                               Number of obs   =     42715 
                                                                                                                          Wald chi2(4)    =     759.68 
                                                                                                                           Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -29207.709                                                                  Pseudo R2      =     0.0130 
Impstat  Coef.  Robust Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
ln(PB)  -0.15358  0.006227  -24.66  0  -0.16579  -0.14138 
ln(PB)
2  -0.02001  0.002068  -9.67  0  -0.02406  -0.01595 
ln(GDP)  -0.03536  0.012881  -2.74  0.006  -0.0606  -0.01011 
ln(EMI)  0.032187  0.015455  2.08  0.037  0.001896  0.062478 










Figure 11:  Sensitivity to Cost and Benefit 
 
 






Specification 5: with cost, benefit and years 
 
This  model  estimates  the  influence  of  the  passage  of  time  on  the  probability  of  an  EE 
measure being accepted. The following is obtained: the coefficient   is negative and significant 
(table  9).  It  shows  a  level  of  depletion  in  the  effectiveness  of  the  EE  improvement  programme, 
perhaps  due  to  the  best  opportunities  already  having  been  taken,  as  mentioned  in  some  of  the 
intuitions in Section 2 above. 
 
                   (11) 
 
Table 9  
Probit regression                                                                                              Number of obs   =      50944 
                                                                                                                        Wald chi2(3)       =     1118.51 
                                                                                                                         Prob > chi2        =      0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -34643.098                                                                Pseudo R2         =       0.0168 
Impstat  Coef.  Robust Std. 
Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
ln (COST)  -0.11823  0.004127  -28.65  0  -0.12632  -0.11014 
ln(BEN)  0.089941  0.005246  17.15  0  0.079659  0.100222 
ln (Year)  -29.9548  1.841508  -16.27  0  -33.5641  -26.3455 
constant  227.8829  13.98914  16.29  0  200.4647  255.3011 
 
 





Specification 6: with cost, benefit and state variables 
 
This model shows costs, benefits, the GDP of the state where the plant is located and the 
emissions from that state: 
 
   (12) 
 
The results are in table 10. The graphs in figure 14 show that the results for cost and benefit 
are similar to those for payback time: a decrease in costs leads to a large increase in the probability of 
an EE investment project being accepted.  An increase in annual savings is also an important factor, 
but its impact is not so great. The x-axis on the graph shows cost and benefit amounts as percentages 
of the mean of the sample for all the firms considered.  
 
Table 10  
Probit regression                                                                                            Number of obs   =      42514 
                                                                                                                       Wald chi2(4)      =      687.01 
                                                                                                                        Prob > chi2        =      0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -29080.508                                                               Pseudo R2         =       0.0124 
impstat  Coef.  Robust Std. Err.  Z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
ln (COST)  -0.11366  0.004458  -25.5  0  -0.1224  -0.10492 
ln(BEN)  0.082715  0.005659  14.62  0  0.071623  0.093807 
ln (GDP)  -0.03282  0.012928  -2.54  0.011  -0.05816  -0.00748 
ln (EMI)  0.034495  0.0155  2.23  0.026  0.004117  0.064874 
constant  0.401574  0.081071  4.95  0  0.242678  0.56047 
 
 
Figure 14   
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Specification 7: with cost, benefit, state variables and dummies 
 
                           (13) 
Table 11 
Probit regression                                                                                                                Number of obs   =      42514 
                                                                                                                                           Wald chi2(52)    =    2356.45   
                                                                                                                                            Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -28180.768                                                                                  Pseudo R2         =     0.0430 
Impstat  Coef.  Robust Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
ln (COST)  -0.09681  0.004768  -20.31  0  -0.10616  -0.08747 
ln(BEN)  0.086812  0.005948  14.59  0  0.075154  0.09847 
ln (GDP)  -0.0728  0.022487  -3.24  0.001  -0.11687  -0.02873 
ln (EMI)  0.082751  0.032041  2.58  0.01  0.019952  0.145549 
California  0.286155  0.034831  8.22  0  0.217887  0.354423 
Maine  -0.63596  0.152735  -4.16  0  -0.93532  -0.33661 
Missouri  0.130994  0.058517  2.24  0.025  0.016303  0.245685 
Newmexico  -0.44021  0.121918  -3.61  0  -0.67916  -0.20125 
northcarol~a  0.295689  0.039075  7.57  0  0.219103  0.372275 
Northdakota  -0.53814  0.193904  -2.78  0.006  -0.91818  -0.15809 
Ohio  0.170161  0.051805  3.28  0.001  0.068625  0.271697 
Texas  0.203734  0.057694  3.53  0  0.090656  0.316812 
Utah  -0.3957  0.072013  -5.49  0  -0.53684  -0.25456 
Cam  0.325418  0.055085  5.91  0  0.217453  0.433383 
Cbd  0.068924  0.036065  1.91  0.056  -0.00176  0.13961 
Cco  0.367916  0.035995  10.22  0  0.297367  0.438466 
Cgt  0.251082  0.035312  7.11  0  0.181871  0.320292 
Cia  0.230898  0.031977  7.22  0  0.168224  0.293572 
Cic  0.135649  0.057453  2.36  0.018  0.023043  0.248254 
Cll  0.374912  0.052714  7.11  0  0.271594  0.478229 
Cma  0.366236  0.042281  8.66  0  0.283367  0.449104 
Cmi  -0.33423  0.059953  -5.57  0  -0.45174  -0.21673 
Cok  0.17047  0.037532  4.54  0  0.096908  0.244031 
Cor  0.436171  0.041089  10.62  0  0.355639  0.516703 
Csf  -0.17969  0.039012  -4.61  0  -0.25615  -0.10322 
Csu  0.369964  0.056194  6.58  0  0.259826  0.480103 
Ctt  -0.31345  0.17038  -1.84  0.066  -0.64739  0.020491 
Cua  -0.31308  0.171901  -1.82  0.069  -0.65  0.02384 
Cud  0.150231  0.059439  2.53  0.011  0.033733  0.266729 
Cuf  0.06981  0.037359  1.87  0.062  -0.00341  0.143032 
Cum  0.120944  0.043454  2.78  0.005  0.035775  0.206112 
Cwv  0.413434  0.040145  10.3  0  0.334752  0.492117 
Car  0.659539  0.04924  13.39  0  0.56303  0.756048 
Cku  0.245366  0.045335  5.41  0  0.156512  0.334221 
Cme  0.921032  0.154905  5.95  0  0.617423  1.224641 
Cds  0.363781  0.0604  6.02  0  0.245399  0.482162 
Cmo  0.247316  0.066673  3.71  0  0.116639  0.377993 
Cul  -0.39772  0.082101  -4.84  0  -0.55864  -0.23681 
sic20  0.043976  0.020054  2.19  0.028  0.00467  0.083281 
sic21  0.435991  0.258138  1.69  0.091  -0.06995  0.941933 
sic25  0.078751  0.038822  2.03  0.043  0.002661  0.154841 
sic29  0.153813  0.068846  2.23  0.025  0.018877  0.28875 
sic35  0.059218  0.021157  2.8  0.005  0.01775  0.100685 
sic37  0.11623  0.027806  4.18  0  0.061731  0.170729 
arc21  -0.49468  0.092394  -5.35  0  -0.67577  -0.31359 
arc22  -0.26159  0.040379  -6.48  0  -0.34073  -0.18245 
arc23  -0.21376  0.041568  -5.14  0  -0.29523  -0.13229 
arc24  0.263009  0.030505  8.62  0  0.20322  0.322797 
arc25  -0.4226  0.129612  -3.26  0.001  -0.67663  -0.16856 
arc27  0.075689  0.030941  2.45  0.014  0.015045  0.136333 
arc28  -0.33857  0.08137  -4.16  0  -0.49805  -0.17909 
arc29  -1.27075  0.307321  -4.13  0  -1.87309  -0.66841 
Constant  0.082895  0.131656  0.63  0.529  -0.17515  0.340936 
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Further research  
 
There are  many  interesting  factors that have been  highlighted  in this paper that deserve 
further investigation in coming contributions. Parallel to this analysis some efforts have been done to 
further  unravel  the  relationship  among  the  propensity  to  invest  in  energy  efficiency  and  the 
environmental  stringency  in  the  States  where  companies  are  located.  This  approach  has  been 
developed  by  the  use  of  the  Industry  Adjusted  Index  of  State  Environmental  Compliance  Cost 
(Levinson, 2001). Unfortunately the index only covers the period from 1977 to 1994 and has been 
outside the scope of this paper to update it. In any case, some preliminary regressions have been run 
for the 1984-1994 period with more than 15,600 observations out of the total 60,463 of the database 
used on this paper. Although a deeper analysis is granted, existing results show that the index is 
significant and has the correct positive sign in most of the specifications
9.  
6  Policy Implications and Conclusions   
The rate of investment in energy efficiency measures continues to be a core part of any 
energy policy, particularly in a context in which environmental variables (especially climate change) 
are increasingly important. No public policy manager or employer can reject the potential scope for 
improvement that EE policies continue to offer. Indeed, the package of energy and climate change 
measures proposed by the European Union, 20-20-20
10 and the well-known Waxman-Markey bill for 
dealing with climate change in the United States envisage energy e fficiency as one of the chief 
instruments for reducing CO2 emissions. This paper provides additional information which is highly 
relevant for the optimal design of energy efficiency support policies, based on the results of a 
programme that has been up and running in the USA for over 30 years and behaviour patterns shown 
by firms. 
A preliminary analysis of the raw data suggests that along with other temporary effects 
which are difficult to determine there is also, as might be expected, a depletion effect in  investment 
opportunities. In other words the best investments are made first and less attractive measures are left 
for  later.  The  investment  implementation  rate  is  relatively  low  for  the  total  number  of 
recommendations made. This probably indicates that the recommendations made are not as suitable as 
they  could  be,  that  other  factors  exist  which  are  judged  to  be  more  important  than  these 
recommendations when it comes to deciding whether or not to invest, or a combination of the two. 
There is also clear evi dence from econometric models in support of the idea that the 
payback time variable is determinant in investment decisions, as might be expected. Investment cost 
is also highly important. 
                                                   
9 Preliminary regressions are available from the authors upon request. 
10 Gallastegui and Galarraga (2010) (8). 26 
 
In addition, the following main conclusions can be drawn from the two families of models 
used in this study (payback time and cost/benefit): 
1.  Changes  in  payback  time  have  a  non-linear  influence  on  investment  decisions,  so  the 
tendency is different depending on the times involved. 
2.  The probability of an investment being made in years decreases as the payback time in years 
increases, while sensitivity increases significantly. 
3.  Firms located in the states with the highest levels of GHG emissions are more likely to invest 
in EE. And, according to preliminary results, also those with more stringent environmental legislation. 
4.  Firms located in the states where GDP from manufacturing industry is highest are less likely 
to invest in EE.  
5.  Investment cost has more influence on investment decisions than potential benefits.  
6.  Logically, the rate of investment in EE is highest when considerable savings (or benefits) may 
be expected from low-cost investments, but there is a ceiling of 70% which is not easily exceeded 
even when these two favourable factors combine.  
7.  Both reductions in costs and increases in expected savings increase the likelihood of an EE 
investment project being accepted, though the impact of the latter is lower. 
When it comes to offering recommendations on policy design, the need to study in greater 
depth the context in which investments take place cannot be obviated; other aspects that must be 
assessed  include behaviour patterns, the availability  of  loans and  other financial factors that  may 
influence  decisions. Even so, the results presented  here  offer intuitions  which are  most useful to 
policy-makers. 
Particularly  noteworthy  is  the  importance  of  payback  time  compared  to  other  variables, 
especially in investments with payback times of less than one year. The link between this variable and 
the soundness of the teams of recommenders may merit a more thorough investigation, but it lies 
outside  the  scope  of  this  study.  Therefore,  any  policy  that  directly  or  indirectly  helps  to  reduce 
payback time must initially be seen as an option worth bearing in mind. As payback time increases the 
effectiveness of policies gradually decreases, so it can also be asserted that measures affecting shorter 
payback times will be more efficient than those affecting longer payback times. For the latter more 
specific, nuanced policies may be preferable. 
The  GDP  of  the  industry  where  measures  are  to  be  implemented  is  another  important 
variable  to  be  considered.  Perhaps  counter  intuitively,  firms  located  in  geographical  areas  where 
aggregate output is lower are found to be more likely to invest as a result of the programme. This 
greater likelihood to accept support among industries in areas with lower sectoral GDPs may be a 
clear reflection that such firms are in greater need of support than others whose results are better. 
Likewise, firms in states where GHG emission levels are highest are found to be more likely to invest 
as per the recommendations made under the programme. In other words, in terms of both actual needs 27 
 
for support and sensitivity to changes in behaviour as a result of policies, regions with low or sectoral 
GDPs and higher emission levels should be targeted on a priority basis by public sector policies. 
Given that cost seems to outweigh potential benefits as a factor in deciding whether to make 
an  investment,  policies  that  focus  on  cost  should  be  more  effective  in  getting  firms  to  make 
investments in energy efficiency. Instruments such as tax deductions, direct subsidies, cheaper loans 
and taxes on pollution-causing activities seem to be the best options to encourage energy efficiency in 
specific areas of activity. Instruments that focus on future savings, such as carbon pricing and energy 
pricing policies, are likely to be less useful in achieving this objective. This apparent paradox suggests 
that along with the proven need for worldwide carbon pricing policies (Neuhoff,  2008), measures to 
help reduce the total cost of investment rather than the relative cost continue to be essential, and 
above all highly effective, in supporting certain industries and sectors. The well-known short-termism 
effect  (which,  as  mentioned  above,  can  be  seen  even  among  individuals)  is  also  observable  in 
industrial activities (Graham et al, 2005).  A detailed analysis of the actual discount rates applied in 
these industrial sectors might shed more light on this matter. 
Finally, the depletion effect and the apparent existence of an investment ceiling (found here 
to be around 70%) suggest that policies of this type should be reassessed regularly to gauge their 
actual impact and make any adjustments that may be needed to ensure their continued effectiveness. 
The findings of the study presented here are consistent with those of Anderson and Newell 
(2004) though our sample differs significantly from theirs: we focus on measures concerned with 
electricity and use data on a 25 year period from 1984 to 2008, while they consider general measures 
that include other savings, such as particular fuels, using data on the period from 1981 to 2000. Our 
study also considers other factors such as regional variables (at state level), assessment centres and 
trends over time. Rather than assessing the decision-making models of firms, we take them as given 
and focus on those energy policy measures that could be taken which would have the greatest effect, 
since  firms  behave  in  the  way  revealed  by  the  database.  In  particular,  we  look  in  depth  at  the 
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